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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE S~ATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE, A 
Municipal Corporatio~, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
DEBBIE L. HANNA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
• 
. 
• 
. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
. 
• 
. 
. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 17081 
Appellant appeals from a conviction of a violation of § 
38-8-5(3) of the Revised Ordinances of the City of South Salt 
Lake City (1974 as amended) which ordinance Appellant claims is 
unconstitutional. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was originally prosecuted in South Salt Lake 
Justice Court and convicted on January 15, 1980·. An appeal of 
the conviction resulted in a second conviction by a jury and a 
judgment on that conviction by Judge Christine M. Durham. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of conviction and 
a determination that the ordinance of the City of South Sal~ 
Lake under which Appellant was convicted is unconstitutional. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondents agree with Appellant's statement of the facts. 
POINT I. 
A. 
ARGUMENT 
SECTION 3B-8-5(3) OF THE SOUTH SALT LAKE REVISED 
ORDINANCES IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. 
SOURCES OF THE POLICE POWER. 
The Constitution of Utah Article XI Section 5 provides that 
municipalities shall have: 
• • • the authority to exercise all powers 
relating to municipal affairs, and to adopt 
and enforce within its limits local police, 
sanitary and similar regulations not in 
conflict with general law, and no enumera-
tion of powers in this Constitution or any 
law shall be deemed to limit or restrict the 
general grant of authority hereby conferred, 
• • • 
The Gtah legislature, in pursuance of this Constitutional 
provision has enacted several statutes evidencing this policy. 
Section 10-8-84 Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended is a 
general.grant of police power to chartered municipalities. It 
states: 
They [municipalities] may pass all ordi-
nances and rules, and make all regulations, 
not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying 
into effect or discharging all powers and 
duties conferred by this charter, and such 
as are necessary and proper to provide for 
the safety and preserve the health, and 
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, 
peace and good order, comfort and conveni-
ence of the city and the inhabitants there-
of, and for the protection of property 
therein; and may enforce obedience to such 
ordinances with such fines or penalties as 
they may deem proper; provided that the 
punishment of any offense shall be by fine 
- 2 -
/* 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in any sum less than $300.00 or by impri5on-
ment not to exceed 6 months, or by both such 
fine and imprisonment. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Two additional statutes give cities further 9owers in 
dealing with some particular areas of concern within the ambit 
of the general welfare clause. 
Section 10-8-51 grants power to punish certain undesirables 
as follows: 
They may provide for the punishment of 
tramps, street beggars, prostitutes, 
habitual disturbers of the peace, pick-
pockets, gamblers and thieves, or persons 
who practice any game, trick or device with 
intent to swindle. 
Section 10-8-41 authorizes cities to: 
Suppress and prohibit the keeping of dis-
orderly houses, houses of ill fame or 
assignation, or houses kept by, maintained 
for, or resorted to or used by, one or more 
persons for acts of perversion, lewdness or 
prostitution within the limits of the city 
and within three miles of the outer bound-
aries thereof, and may prohibit resorting 
thereto for any of the purposes aforesaid; 
they may also make it unlawful for any 
person to commit or offer or agree to commit 
an act of sexual intercourse for hire, 
lewdness or moral perversion within the 
city, or for any person to secure, induce, 
procure, offer or transport to any place 
within the city any person for the purpose 
of committing an act of sexual intercourse 
for hire, lewdness or moral perversion, or 
for any person to receive or direct or offer 
or agree to receive or direct any person 
into any place or building within the city 
for the purpose of committing an act of 
sexual intercourse for hire, lewdness or 
moral perversion, or for any person to aid, 
abet or participate in the commission of any 
of the foregoing; and they may also suppress 
and prohibit gambling houses and gambling, 
lotteries and all fraudulent devices and 
practices, and all kinds of gaming, playing 
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at dice or cards, and other games of chance, 
and the sale, distribution or exhibition of 
obscene or lewd publications, prints, 
pictures or illustrations. 
The legislative grants of power, as well as the constitu-
tional provision(s), are all made in broad terms, leaving the 
many substantive requirements and definitions to the respective 
entities for their drafting and elaboration. Clearly, it is 
the prerogative and duty of the municipalities to legislate, 
and thereby implement these delegated powers. 
B. THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE SHOULD BE BROADLY 
CONSTRUED TO ACCORD MUNICIPALITIES WIDE DISCRE-
TION IN EXERCISING POLICE POWER. 
The ma]or issue in the present action is whether the City 
of .South Salt Lake had the authority under 10-8-84 Utah Code 
Ann. (1953) as amended, to enact ordinance 38-8-5(3). Under a 
broad interpretation of the general welfare clause, the ordi-
nance would be a valid exercise of that authority. 
The case law of this state has presented conflicting 
views. The rule requiring strict construction of delegated 
powers, often called the Dillon Rule, may be found in some 
cases in this state. See, e.g., American Fork City v. Robin-
~' 77 Utah 168, 292 P. 249 (1930): Salt Lake Citv v. Sutter, 
61 Utah 533, 216 P. 234 (1923); Utah Transit Co. v. Ogden City, 
89 Utah 546, 58 P.2d 1 (1936); Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, 106 
Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773 (1944); Layton City v. Speth, 578 P.2d 
828 (Utah 1978). 
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But this court has on many occasions given jroad interpre-
tations to both specific grants of authority and the general 
welfare clause. See, e.g., Salt Lake City!v. Doran, 42 Utah 
401, 131 P. 636 (1913); Salt Lake Citv v. Howe, 37 Utah 170, 
106 P. 705 (1910); Salt Lake City v. Allred, 20 Utah 2d 298, 
437 P.2d 434 (1968); Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 33 
(Utah 1980); Layton City v. Glines, 616 P.2d 588 (Utah 1980). 
This court was recently faced with an identical issue in 
the case of State v. Hutchinson, P.2d (Utah 1980) No. 
16087. There, the court phrased the issue as" .•• whether§ 
17-5-77 by itself provides Salt Lake County legal authority to 
enact the ordinance or whether there must be a specific grant · 
of authority for counties to enact measures dealing with dis-
closures of campaign financing to sustain the ordinance in 
question." (§ 17-5-77 is the statutory grant of general wel-
fare power to counties, substantially identical to § 10-8-84.). 
The defendant Hutchinson was charged with violation of § 
1-10-4 Revised Ordinance of Salt Lake County, which requires 
filing of campaign statements with the county disclosing cam-
paign contributions. The city court dismissed the complaint on 
the ground that the ordinance was in violation of the Utah 
Constitution. The district court affirmed the dismissal, 
applying the strict construction standard, and thus, found that 
there was no express authority in state statutes authorizing § 
1-10-4, nor could the authority be implied from any express 
power. 
- 5 -
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On appeal to this court, Hutchinson argued that absent a 
specific grant of authority to enact the ordinance, the general 
welfare clause could not be construed expansive enough to 
confer power to enact the ordinance. This argument obviously 
advocated the restrictive Dillon rule of construction for 
general grants of authority. The court, however, expressly 
rejected the appellant's argument as well as the Dillon rule. 
The court then set up a definite standard for braod construc-
tion of general welfare clauses and also specific grants of 
authority. 
In rejecting the rule of strict construction, the court 
employed cogent language: 
The rule requiring strict construction of 
the powers delegated by the legislature to 
counties and municipalities is a rule which 
is archaic, unrealistic, and unresponsive to 
the current needs of both state and local 
governments and effectively nullifies a 
legislature's grant of general police power 
to the counties. 
* * * 
Strict construction, particularly in the 
face of a general welfare grant of power to 
local governments simply eviscerates the 
plain language of the statute, nullifies the 
intent of the Legislature, and seriously 
crip~les effective local government. 
The court then proceeded to consider the case law in Utah and 
outlined tne importance of broad interpretations of police 
power. It also reviewed decisions of courts in other states 
agreeing with the position that a general welfare clause con-
fers power in addition to and beyond that granted by specific 
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statutory grants. See State v. Hutchinson, P.2d (Utah 
1980), at 13-14 and included citations. 
The court then conclusively rejected the strict construe-
tion, stating at page 17: 
Broad construction of the powers of 
counties and cities is consistent with the 
current needs of local governments. The 
Dillon Rule of strict construction is anti-
thetical to effective and efficient local 
and state government. If at one time it 
served a valid purpose, it does so no 
longer. The complexities confronting local 
governments, and the degree to which the 
nature of those problems varies from county 
to county and city to city, has changed 
since the Dillon Rule was formulated. 
Several counties in this state, for example, 
currently confront large and serious 
problems caused by accelerated urban 
growth. The same problems, however, are not 
so acute in many other counties. Some 
counties are experiencing, and others may 
soon be experiencing, explosive economic 
growth as the result of the development of 
natural resources. The problems that must 
be solved by these counties are to some 
extent unique to them. According a plain 
meaning to the legislative grant of general 
welfare power to local governmental units 
allows each local government to be respon-
sive to the particular problems facing it. 
Local power should not be paralyzed and 
critical problems should not remain unsolved 
while officials await a biennial session of 
the Legislature in the hope of obtaining 
passage of a special grant of authority. 
Furthermore, passage of legislation needed 
or appropriate for some counties may fail 
because of the press of other legislative 
business or the disinterest of legislators 
from other parts of the State whose consti-
tuencies experience other, and to them more 
pressing, problems. In granting cities and 
counties the power to enact ordinances to 
further the general welfare, the Legislature 
no doubt took such political realities into 
consideration. (Emphasis supplied.) 
- 7 -
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The recent case of Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake CountY commis-
sion, P.2d (No. 16833 Filed January 19, 1981), dealt 
with the constitutionality of the "massage parlor" ordinance of 
Salt Lake Co~nty. The massage parlor ordinance of the City of 
South Salt Lake is virtually identical to the one in Salt Lake 
County. The court upheld the constitutionality of the ordi-
nance in all respects. In dealing with the police power of the 
county the court stated at page 5-6: 
It is not the function of this Court to 
evaluate the wisdom or practical necessity 
of legislative enactments. The form of the 
challenged provision, when read in conjunc-
tion with the minutes of the public meeting 
held prior to its enactment, clearly 
evidenced a concern on the part of the 
Commission that the state statutory frame-
work, unsupplemented by local ordinances, 
presented insurmountable enforcement 
problems in the case of massage parlors. We 
will not presume to second-guess the sound-
ness of that decision. 
In the instant case, the County has 
been given express power to make rules and 
regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary 
and proper to improve the morals, preserve 
the health, peace and good order among its 
citizenry. The practice of prostitution 
within the County has presented a clear 
threat to the attainment of those goals, and 
its prevention in the seclusion of a seem-
ingly legitimate massage parlor has proven 
sufficiently difficult that an ordinance of 
the sort here in question must be regarded 
as having been enacted pursuant to power 
fairly implied from the express provision of 
state law. 
Obviously, the public policy of Utah is to afford municipal 
authorities wide discretion in the reasonable and nondiscrimin-
- 8 -
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atory exercise, in good faith, of the police power in t~e 
public interest. 
c. THE HUTCHINSON DECISION SET UP A REASONABLENESS 
AND APPROPRIATENESS STANDARD. 
The court clarified Utah law by following the general trend 
in other jurisdictions, recognizing that a general welfare 
clause grants power and authority in addition to specific 
grants of authority. It stated: 
When the State has granted ~eneral welfare 
power to local governments, those govern-
ments have independent authority apart from, 
and in addition to, specific grants of 
authority to pass ordinances which are 
reasonably and appropriately related to the 
objectives of that power, i.e., providing 
for the public safety, health, morals, and 
welfare. Hutchinson, supra at page 15. 
In further describing the difference and interplay of specific 
grants of authority and general grants, the court stated at 
pages 16-17: 
Specific grants of authority may serve to 
limit the means available under the general 
welfare clause, for some limitation may be 
imposed on the exercise of power by direct-
ing the use of power in a particular 
manner. But specific grants should be 
construed with reasonable latitude in light 
of the broad language of the general welfare 
clause which may supplement the 9ower found 
in a specific delegation. 
The court relied upon Salt Lake City v. Allred, supra, in 
enunciating the standard. In Allred, the defendant was con-
victed in city court of violation of a municipal ordinance 
prohibiting "aiding or abetting in the direction of any person 
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to any place or building for the purpose of committing an act 
of sexual intercourse for hire." The defendant argued that 
while statutes specifically empowered the state to prohibit and 
suppress prostitution, mere aiding and abetting in the direc-
tion of a person was not within that specific delegation of 
authority. Defendant further argued that the general welfare 
provision should be strictly construed as not enabling the City 
to make such conduct unlawful. 
In upholding the validity of the ordinance under the 
general police power delegated to cities by § 10-8-84 Utah Code 
Ann. (1953) as amended, the court stated: 
It is a well-settled rule that it is a 
proper exercise of the police power ••• to 
preserve and protect the public morals, and 
any practice of business which has a 
tendency to weaken or corrupt the morals of 
those who follow it, as shown by experience, 
is such conduct as affects the public 
morals •• 
* * * 
The protection of public morals has always 
been a matter of local concern which 
requires regulation by municipalities, and 
properly falls within the scope of the 
police power. 
After reviewing the city ordinance and the pertinent state 
I 
statutes, the court held that: 
••• both the city ordinance and state 
statute have the common purpose of defeating 
the practice of business of prostitution 
• . . and are closely related in subject 
matter. The mere fact that an act denounced 
as a crime under the ordinance which is not 
denounced as a crime under the statute would 
not necessarily render the act under the 
ordinance inconsistent with the statute 
where as here the ordinance is within the 
scope of the state law dealing with the same 
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related subject of sex~al offenses and is in 
no way repugnant to, but ... in harmony 
with the state laws. 
At the time of the Allred decision, Utah general law was 
void of any statute dealing with the aiding and abetting of the 
public evil of prostitution. However, it is interesting to 
note that five years later the Legislature recognized the 
necessity of such a law and enacted a statute very similar to 
the ordinance upheld in Allred. This seems to lend credence to 
the language (quoted above) of Hutchinson that local power 
should not be paralyzed and critical problems should not remain 
unsolved while officials await a biennial session of the Legis-
lature. 
The appellant here contends that 3B-8-5(3) creates a new 
crime. The same contention was advanced in Allred. Hence, 
under Allred the test must be whether state law and 38-8-5(3) 
have a common purpose of defeating sexual offenses and are 
closely related in subject matter. 
The South Salt Lake city ordinance is substantially the 
same as § 15-18-5(3) Revised Ordinance of Salt Lake County 
(1966) as amended. The overriding concern of these ordinances 
is to prevent the licentiousness that breeds in massage ?ar-
lors. The act of fondling or touching of the genitalia of 
massage customers is clearly offensive to the public morals and 
a conducive environment for the flourishing of prostitution. 
It is a local concern within the authority of Salt Lake to 
proscribe. 
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Touching or offering to touch the genitalia of a patron is 
a related subject matter to prostitution, if not an aid to the 
proliferation of prostitution. The City of south Salt Lake and 
. 
Salt Lake County obviously feel that in rorder to eliminate the 
evil of prostitution and sexual offenses, it is necessary to 
proscribe indecent touching which often is associated with 
massages. This would definitely fall within the common purpose 
of State law in defeating the practice of prostitution. 
In Allred, the ordinance upheld proscribed the mere direct-
ing of a person to a place or building for purpose of prostitu-
tion. It was, as the Court felt, a minor extension of the 
common purpose and a related subject matter. The ordinance at 
issue here is also a minor extension of the common purpose and 
of a related subject matter. 
The ordinance in question, then, is reasonably and appro--
priately related to the objectives of the police power, i.e., 
provide for the safety and preserve the h~alth, promote pros-
perity, and improve the morals of the community. 
In Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 
(1938} , this court upheld an ordinance which ?rohibited driving 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Two statu-
tory grants of power were cited by the City in support of the 
ordinance; one specific, i.e., power to regulate movement of 
traffic, the other general, i.e., the police power. The court, 
not wishing to construe the specific statute, held that the 
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predecessor to § 10-8-84 was adequate authority to support the 
ordinance. 
The Hutchinson case was a culmination of several recent 
decisions upholding a broad interpretation of the general 
welfare powers. In Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367 (Utah 1978), 
this court upheld the power of Salt Lake City to pass an ordi-
nance preventing cruelty to animals by proscribing cock fight-
ing. The court concluded that cock fighting was " •.. discor-
dant to man's better instincts and so offensive to his finer 
sensibilities that it is demeaning to morals" and hence, within 
the prerogative and responsibility of the city to enact laws to 
protect, promote, and preserve the health, safety, morals and 
general welfare of society. If cock fighting is offensive to 
public morals, then clearly the conduct proscribed by 3B-8-5(3) 
qualifies for such a classification. 
In Call v. Citv of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979), 
this court decided that the City of West Jordan had the power 
to require subdividers to dedicate seven percent of the land 
area of a prospective subdivision to the public use of the 
citizens of the City of West Jordan, or in the alternative, the 
equivalent value of land in cash. The ordinance was sustained 
under § 10-8-84, the grant of general welfare powe~, as well as 
other provision dealing generally with planning and zoning. 
Layton City v. Glines, 616 P.2d 588 (Utah 1980), like 
Kusse, supra, dealt with minicipal authority under § 10-8-84 to 
enact an ordinance dealing with driving under the influence of 
- 13 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
alcohol. Again, absent specific statutory authorization, the 
ordinance was upheld under the broad police powers delegated to 
cities. Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980)' is 
further authority for broad construction of the general welfare 
power. 
This court has also held that reasonable latitude of 
judgment and discretion is essential for local governments to 
exercise its express and implied powers. 
Call v. City of West Jordan, supra, recognized this prin-
ciple, concluding that it is impractical for statutes to spell 
out to the last detail all of the things city government must 
do to perform the functions imposed upon them by law. "The 
courts will not interfere with the legislative choice of the 
means selected unless it is arbitrary, or is directly prohi-
bited by, or inconsistent with the policy of the state or 
federal laws or the constitution of this State or of the United 
States." State v. Hutchinson, supra, at 16. 
Hence, even under the express grant to prohibit and sup-
press prostitution, the ordinance may be declared constitution-
al. In order to perform the function imposed upon it, the City 
of South Salt Lake has selected § 38-8-5(3) as one part of its 
scheme in achieving that objective. The ordinance is not 
arbitrary nor prohibited by general law. It is not repugnant 
to either the Utah constitution or the United States constitu-
tion, but, rather, is in harmony with them. 
- 14 -
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The ordinance of South Salt Lake is in f~rt~erance of the 
stated policy of Utah to defeat prostitution and sexual 
offenses, and is not prohibited by state statute. It is 
reasonable and appropriate to prevent illicit sexual conduct. 
The general welfare clause is sufficient authorization for the 
ordinance. 
D. STATE LAW HAS NOT PRE-EMPTED THE FIELD OF SEXUAL 
OFFENSES. 
The appellant contends that the public policy regarding 
illegal sexual activity is clearly set forth by State statute, 
§§ 76-10-1301 et. seq. Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended. The 
heart of the argument is that the State law is conclusive in 
the area and any additional law, whether related or not, must 
be inconsistent. 
This court has, on several occasions, rejected this preemp-
tion argument. In Salt Lake City v. Kusse, suora, it was held 
that a local municipal ordinance is not in conflict with a 
similar state criminal statute unless (1) the local ordinance 
permits activities prohibited by the state law, or (2) the 
local ordinance is inconsistent with the state law. The court 
stated at 673: 
The city does not attempt to authorize by 
this ordinance what the Legislature has 
expressly forbidden; nor does it forbid what 
the Legislature has expressly licensed, 
authorized or required. 
* * * 
Unless legislative provisions are contradic-
tory in the sense they cannot coexist, they 
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are not to be deemed inconsistent because of 
the mere lack of uniformity and detail. 
Then in Salt Lake City v. Allred, supra, the court was 
faced with the preemption issue in the context of sexual 
offenses, as in the present case. The court concluded that the 
state had not preempted the field of sexual offenses, stating 
in part at page 436: 
There is nothing in the state statutes 
regulating sexual offenses that evidences 
any express or implied intent to preclude 
local governments from also attempting to 
prohibit and suppress the difficult problem 
of the sex offender. Therefore, it is our 
opinion that the city is not precluded in 
enacting the ordinance in question unless it 
is inconsistent or in conflict with the 
state statutes dealing with sex offenses. 
It is a well-established principle in this 
state that the city has the right to legis-
late on the same subject as the state 
statute where either the general police 
power or express granted authority is con-
ferred ·upon municipalities. {citations 
omitted) 
However, the defendant contends in the case 
before us that the ordinance in question is 
inconsistent and in conflict with the state 
laws and, therefore, invalid on the grounds 
that the ordinance attempts to make crimes 
of acts which are not crimes under the state 
laws. assuming this to be true, a careful 
examination of the city ordinance (citation 
omitted) and the material sections of the 
state laws pertaining to sexual offenses, 
(citations omitted) reveals that both the 
city ordinance and the state statutes have 
the common purpose of defeating the practice 
of business of prostitution or the vice of 
sexual intercourse for hire and are closely 
related in subject matter. The mere fact 
that an act denounced as a crime under the 
ordinance which is not denounced as a crime 
under the statute would not necessarily 
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render the act under the ordinance inconsis-
tent with the statute whereas here the 
ordinance is within the scope of the state 
law dealing with the same related subject of 
sexual offenses and is in no way repugnant 
to, but on the other hand is in harmony with 
the state laws. We believe the ordinance is 
consistent with the statute pertaining to 
sex offenses. 
The appellant argues that since state law has preempted the 
sexual offense field, any attempt to make a crime of something 
not dealt with directly by § 76-10-1301 Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
as amended, is not a sexual offense and therefore inconsistent 
with state law. However, under Allred and Hutchinson, two 
local governments were empowered, under the general welfare 
clause, to create new crimes for the protection of public 
morals, so long as they reasonably related to the purpose of 
the police power. The appellant's contention is untenable in 
light of recent decisions. 
In Hutchinson, the court also dealt with the preemption 
issue. In rejecting preemption, it was said at page 18: 
The subject of campaign disclosure require-
ments is not one that reflects a need for 
uniformity. With the differences in the 
nature of the counties in the State of Utah 
with respect to population, wealth, and 
other factors . • • , it is reasonable, in 
the absence of State legislation, that each 
county should deal with the problem of the 
integrity of its electoral processes as it 
deems appropriate. The ordinances in this 
case do not conflict, directly or impliedly, 
with any state statute and are not for that 
reason unconstitutional. 
The court in effect took a pragmatic posture of applying 
the need of "uniformity" test. The clear policy of this state, 
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regarding sexual offenses and the protection of public morals, 
is expressly not that of uniformity. Pertinent here is § 
76-10-1210 Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended, which is part of a 
series of statutes dealing with public nudity and pornography. 
The section specifically leaves power to the local governments 
to legislate in this area. Allred is further support for this 
point, stating that protection of public morals has always been 
a matter of local concern. 
Redwood Gym, supra, also upheld the rationale of Salt Lake 
City v. Allred that local government may legislate by ordinance 
in areas previously dealt with by state legislation. A com-
panion case, Larry Hollingsworth v. City of South Salt 
Lake, P.2d (No. 16831 Filed January 19, 1981), dealt 
with the specific ordinance in question on this appeal. The 
court specifically relied upon Salt Lake Citv v. Allred, supra, 
in stating at page 2: 
The argument is rebuffed by our holding 
in· the case of Salt Lake City v. Allred. It 
was therein made clear that no provision of 
state law, express or implied, forbade 
cities or other local units of government, 
pursuant to delegated offenders so long as 
no actual conflict arose between the two 
provisions. Such a conflict, moreover, 
would not be found in the simple fact that 
the city provision sought to outlaw and 
penalize actions on which state laws were 
silent. So long as the provisions were 
conducive to the same regulatory end, no 
conflict would be found. (citations omitted) 
The appellant's next point to the alleged conflict in 
penalties between the state statutes dealing with prostitution 
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and those of 38-8-5(3) dealing with massage regulation. They 
cite as authority Layton City 7. Speth, 578 P.2d a:a (Utah 
1978); and Allgood v. Larsen, 545 P.2d 530 {Utah 1976). 
Layton City involved conflict of penalties between the city 
ordinance and the state statute. The state statute provided 
that a third or subsequent conviction under the statute consti-
tutes a class A misdemeanor, while the city ordinance only 
provided for a class B misdemeanor. The city had merely copied 
the state statute. 
In Allgood, the defendant was convicted under the city's 
trespass ordinance which imposed a jail sentence. The State 
law of trespass made it an infraction only, and thus, no pas-
sible jail sentence. The court held that the ordinance was in 
direct conflict with general law. 
The present case can be distinguished from both decisions. 
The present ordinance is not a copy of state law, nor is it in 
direct conflict with a state law. The Allgood court distin-
guished Kusse, supra, which supports the notion that a city may 
prohibit additional things where the legislature has not speci-
f ically forbidden it. 
Salt Lake City v. Allred, suora, states at 436: 
A municipal ordinance is not in conflict 
with a statute authorizing its adoption 
because of a difference in penalties. Thus, 
further and additional penalties may be 
imposed by statute, without creating incon-
sistency and conversely, at least in some 
instances lesser penalties may be imposed by 
the ordinance for violation than by the 
statute without conflict. 
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In Allgood, the ordinance attempted to impose a more strin-
gent penalty and was thus invalid. But the present case is in 
agreement with the language of Allred. 
~urther, the precedential value of the language in Allgood 
and Layton City is diminished by the fact that a majority of 
the justices did not join in the majority opinion in either 
case. 
Both Kusse and Allred were reaffirmed in Hutchinson, thus 
demonstrating that the state has not preempted the field of 
sexual offenses. The South Salt Lake city ordinance does not 
contradict the general law of the state, but rather, it is in 
conformity with it. 
E. SECTION 38-8-5(3} DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I, § 
24, OF THE.UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Appellant argues that the alleged re-definition of prosti-
tution under 3B-8-5(3} is in direct conflict with state law and 
deprives state law of its uniform effect as mandated in Article 
I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution. This argument assumes a 
strict construction of the general welfare authority delegated 
to cities. 
The same issue was propounded in Hutchinson, supra, and the 
court held: 
Finally, contrary to defendant's conten-
tions, a grant of general welfare authority 
to counties does not violate Article I, § 
24, or Article XI, § 4 of the Utah Constitu-
tion, which requires uniform operation of 
general laws and a uniform system of county 
government. The general welfare clause, § 
- 20 -
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17-5-77, applies uniformally to all 
counties. The fact that each county ~ay 
make different use of the power granted is 
of no constitutional moment. Indeed it 
would be absurd and would make a mockery of 
the concept of local self-government to 
require that all counties must have the same 
ordinances as all others. Generally, as to 
county ordinances, Article I, § 24 only 
requires uniformity of laws within the 
jurisdiction in which they are operative. 
Ordinance 38-8-5(3) has been given uniform application over 
all of South Salt Lake City. It is therefore not in conflict 
with Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
POINT II. SECTION 38-8-5{3) DOES NOT DENY EQUAL PRO-
TECTION OF THE LAW TO MASSAGISTS BECAUSE IT 
IS REASONABLY RELATED TO THE LEGITIMATE 
OBJECTIVE OF SUPPRESSING THE USE OF MASSAGE 
PARLORS FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES. 
An early Utah decision set forth the rule regarding classi-
f ications in an equal protection analysis under Utah law. 
Justice Wolfe defined the test in State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 
78 P.2d 920 (1938): 
Of course, every legislative act is in 
one sense discriminatory. The Legislature 
cannot legislate as to all person or all 
subject matters. It is inclusive as to some 
class or group and as to some human rela-
tionships, transactions, or functions and 
exclusive as to the remainder. For that 
reason, to be unconstitutional the discrimi-
nation must be unreasonable or arbitrary. A 
classification is never unreasonable or 
arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion 
features so long as there is some basis for 
the differentiation between classes or 
subject matters included as compared to 
those excluded from its operation provided 
the differentiation bears a reasonable 
relation to the purposes to be accomplished 
by the act. 
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In constitutional challenges to opposite-sex massage ordi-
nances, the courts have uniformily rejected the equal protec-
tion argument. The arguments there are very similar to appel-
lant's here--that other people are not subject to like restric-, 
tions. Patterson v. City of Dallas, 355 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Cir. 
app. 1962), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal 
question, 372 U.S. 251, 83 s. Ct. 873, 9 L.Ed.2d 732 (1963), is 
representative of these cases. The Patterson court stated at 
840-41: 
The question is directly presented: 
Does Section 8-28 of the Code of Civil and 
Criminal Ordinances of the City of Dallas 
bear a reasonable and substantial relation-
ship to the ends sought to be achieved by 
the legislating body, or does same arbitrar-
ily establish a fixed Code of conduct which 
bears but a remote speculative and conjec-
tual relationship to any valid results 
sought to be achieved under the Police power: 
* * * 
From the undisputed testimony of 
Captain Gannaway, and considering the record 
as a whole it is apparent that the Police 
Department of the City of Dallas was con-
fronted with a real problem in the operating 
of massage establishments because of lewd 
acts committed or arising from the massaging 
of a person of one sex by a person of 
another sex. In an effort to correct this 
evil the Police Department of the City of 
Dallas made investigations and collected 
facts.which were presented to the attention 
of the City Council of the City of Dallas 
with the recommendation that the Ordinance 
in question be passed in an attempt to curb 
the evil which then existed. It is to be 
observed that the Section under attack 
prohibits a member of one sex from admin-
istering a massage to a person of the oppo-
site sex, with the exception noted. It does 
not prohibit, but permits, a masseur to 
administer a massage to a member of the male 
sex, and a masseuse to administer a massage 
- 22 -
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to a member of the female sex. The right to 
conduct a massage establishment, after 
complying with the Massage Ordinances and 
securing a permit, is not prohibited but is 
merely regulated. This record does not 
demonstrate failure on the part of the City 
Council to perform its legal functions. 
Appellants have failed to sustain their 
burden of proof to show that the Ordinance 
complained of was enacted without reason or 
that it was enacted arbitrarily. 
Since § 3B-8-5(3) is a copy of the Salt Lake County ordi-
nance, the minutes of the Board of County Commissioners' meet-
ing of November 20, 1978 are relevant here. Those minutes 
contain statements of Captain Morgan of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's office and Assistant Salt Lake County Attorney Ober-
hansy and reflect the serious problems that law enforcement 
officials were faced with as a result of the lewd and immoral 
acts arising from the massage parlors. Each official recom-
mended that the ordinance in question be adopted in an effort 
to curb the problem that then existed in Salt Lake County. See 
Brief of Respondents, Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Commis-
sion, No. 16833, Utah Supreme Court (1981) at 24. 
Redwood Gym, supra, rejected the equal protection challenge 
stating at 10-11: 
Where a legislative enactment creates 
no inherently suspect classification and 
touches upon no fundamental interest as 
recognized by the Constitution, it satisfies 
the exigencies of equal protection if the 
classification made thereby has a rational 
basis in a legitimate legislative objec-
tive. The opposite-sex massage provision 
clearly meets such a standard. 
* * * 
The orevention of acts of prostitution is 
among the oldest and most venerable func-
- 23 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tions of the police power. The difficulty 
of enforcing such prohibitions in a massage 
parlor, where all acts of wrongdoing may be 
confined to a private and isolated locatio~, 
clearly indicates the sort of blanket prohi-
bition prescribed by the subject enactment. 
(citations omitted} 
The Utah Legislature, during the recent session, enacted 
the Massage Practice Act. The bill, S.B. No. 26 (1981), as 
enacted, is a comprehensive licensure measure for the implemen-
tation and enforcement of standards for massage technicians and 
massage establishments. The bill was signed into law by the 
Governor on February 17, 1981. 
After establishing a board of massage, and extensive quali-
fication requirements for a massage license, the bill in Sec-
tion 19, page 7 states: 
The license of a massage technician or a 
massage establishment may be revoked, sus-
pended or cancelled upon any one or more of 
the following grounds: 
(1) 
tution • 
The licensee is guilty of prosti-
• • 
The legislature has recognized the pressing need to control 
the massage industry. Of the various grounds for revocation of 
a license, prostitution occupies the prime position. While the 
particular bill only deals with licensure, it is indicative of 
the legislative concern for the quality of the massage business. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Smith v. 
Keator, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203 (1974), appeal dismissed 
for want of a substantial federal question, 419 U.S. 1043, 95 
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S. Ct. 613, 42 L.Ed.2d 636 (1974), 1Jpheld an opf)osite-sex 
massage ordinance, stating: 
'The barrier erected by the ordinance 
against immoral acts likely toJ result from 
too intimate familiarity of the sexesr is no 
more than a reasonable regulation imposed by 
the city council in the fair exercise of 
police powers.' (Quoting from Ex parte 
Maki, 56 Cal. App. 635, at 638, 133 P.2d 64, 
at 67 (1943). 
* * * 
There is nothing in the ordinance that 
denies the equal protection guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. It applies to all 
alike who give massages for hire. 
* * * 
Class legislation is not offensive to the 
constitution when the classification is 
based on a reasonable distinction and the 
law is made to apply uniformly to all 
members of the class affected. Keator, 
supra, at page 209. 
The ordinance in issue applies uniformly to all masseurs 
and masseuses. It is reasonably related to the legilative 
purpose and the classification is reasonable in light of the 
lewd and immoral acts often encountered in massage establish-
men ts. 
POINT I I I. SECTION 38-8-5(3) IS SPECIFIC AND SUSCEPT-
IBLE TO LOGICAL AND RATIONAL INTERPRETATION 
AND THEREFORE IS NOT VAGUE. 
When a court reviews an ordinance to ascertain its consti-
tutionality, certain rules of construction apply. Those rules 
are described in Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035 (Utah 
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 915, 96 S. Ct. 1514, 47 L.Ed.2d 
766 (1975), and apply equally to the ?resent examination: 
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In reviewing an ordinance or statute to 
ascertain its constitutionality, certain 
rules of construction must be applied: 
(a) A legislative enactment is pre-
sumed to be valid and in conformity with the 
constitution. 
(b) It should not be held to be 
invalid unless it is shown beyond a reason-
able doubt to be incompatible with some 
particular constitutional provision. 
(c) The burden of showing invalidity 
of an ordinance or statute is upon the one 
who makes the challenge. 
In dealing with the vagueness issue, this court has said: 
In regard to plaintiff's contention, these 
things are to be said generally about the 
interpretation and application of a statute 
or ordinance: it is not our duty to indulge 
in conjecture that the statute may be so 
distorted or unreasonably applied that some 
innocent person might come within its 
terms. Rather, it is our duty to assume 
that those who administer a statute will do 
so with reason and common sense, in accord-
ance with its language and intent; and 
further, that if there is a choice as to the 
matter of its interpretation and applica-
tion, that should be done in a manner which 
will make it constitutional, as opposed to 
one which would make it invalid. Peck v. 
Dunn, supra, at 369. 
In State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952), it 
was said: 
It is recognized that statutes should 
not be declared unconstitutional if there is 
3ny reasonable basis upon which they may be 
sustained as falling within the constitu-
tional framework (citations omitted), and 
that a statute will not be held void for 
uncertainty if any sort of sensible, practi-
cal effect may be given it. (Citations 
omitted.) 
This court clearly employed the above rule stating in part: 
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Concerning the charge that the statute 
is void for vagueness: the presumption of 
validity hereinabove stated, gives rise to 
the rule that a statute will not be declared 
unconstitutional for that reason if under 
any sensible interpretation of its language 
it can be given practical effect. The 
requirement is that it must be sufficiently 
clear and definite to inform persons of 
ordinary intelligence what their conduct 
must be to conform to its requirements and 
to advise one accused of violating it what 
constitutes the offense with which he is 
charged. Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 
807 (Utah 1974). 
The language of § 3B-8-5(3), "It shall be unlawful for a 
masseur to touch or offer to touch or massage the genitals of 
customers," is sufficiently clear and definite to inform per-
sons of ordinary intelligence what conduct is proscribed. 
Appellant argues that the ordinance does not require intent 
and therefore allows courts wide latitude in interpretation of 
the ordinance. The appellant hypothesizes that a masseur could 
violate the ordinance by the mere innocent act of brushing or 
bumping the genitals of a customer. 
A similar contention was raised in the declaratory judgment 
action in Peck v. Dunn. There, appellant Peck attempted to 
have a county ordinance declared unconstitutional on two 
grounds. The first ground was that it was vague and uncertain 
in that innocent conduct of merely being a spectator (to a cock 
fight) could be included within its language, and secondly, 
that presence at such a cock fight is proscribed, without 
requiring a culpable mental state. 
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After upholding the ordinance as " ••• justified for the 
purpose of regulating morals and promoting the good order and 
general welfare of society," the court held in regard to the 
intent issue that: 
[After discussing crimes regarding specific 
intent] • • • there is another class of 
crimes in which the doing of the act itself 
constitutes the crime, without regard to the 
intent with which it is done. They are 
spoken of as malum prohibitum, and are 
sometimes referred to as crimes of strict 
liability, or absolute responsibility. 
• • • With respect to this class of crimes, 
the only criminal intent necessary is impli-
cit in the willful doing of the prohibited 
act. 
Applying the principles above stated to 
the plaintiff's contentions, it will be seen 
that a sensible and practical application of 
the ordinance would require a person to be 
present as a spectator in the sense of one 
purposefully and intentionally attending and 
observing such a fight, as opposed to some 
mere passerby happening to so observe it. 
Hollingsworth v. City of South Salt Lake, suora, held that 
this specific statute was not vague: / 
Plaintiffs contend, finally, that the 
provision here under consideration is void 
due to vagueness, in that it fails, by its 
terms, to define precisely what is forbid-
den, and what allowed. We cannot agree that 
any person of reasonable intelligence would 
be left in doubt regarding the nature of the 
act forbidden by the ordinance~ the act of 
touching or massaging the genitals of a 
massage parlor patron, or of making an offer 
to do so, is hardly susceptible of more 
exact definition. at 3. 
The ordinance of South Salt Lake City need not specifically 
require intent, because a sensible and practical application of 
it would require that any offer to, or actual touching or 
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massage, be done with pur?oseful and intentional conduct. We 
must assume that the judicial authorities entrusted with the 
interpretation of this ordinance will employ common sense and 
general understanding of human nature in deciding actions 
before them. 
CONCLUSION 
The exercise of the delegated police power by the City of 
South Salt Lake in enacting ordinance 3B-8-5(3) was valid. The 
recent decisions of this court have sustained this broad 
authority. Similarly, the State has not preempted the field of 
sexual offenses, thus allowing municipalities to legislate in 
the same area. 
The ordinance does not violate the Equal Protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitutionr 
because it applies equally to all parties within a reasonable 
classification. 
Finally, the ordinance is not vague and is susceptible to 
reasonable and rational interpretation. 
The decision of the Third Judicial Court of Utah should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted this day of January, 1981. 
Clinton Balmforth 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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